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Deja Vu? 
Comparing Pearl Harbor and September I I 
D uring my first trip to Hawaii, I made my way to a place considered sacred by most US citizens, the USS Arizona 1ne11101ial at Pearl Harb01: Survivors often greet visitors to the 111emorial, answering questions nnd retelling their 111emories of the day that 
the Japanese attacked the US Pacific Fleet. When it came my turn, I asked what the weather 
was like that fateful mon1ing. The answer wfls ' like today. " A ferm puffy clouds dotted the blue 
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Hawaiia11 skies, a light breeze pushed 
ripples across the turquoise water of the 
harbor, stirring the warm tropical air to 
create one of the most idyllic anchor-
ages on earth. eptember I I also dawned 
clcar:m<l blue O\"er ew York City, the 
kind oflate summer day that highlights 
perfectly the United States' front door, 
the spectacular edifice of promise and 
prosperity that is lower Manhattan. 
Given tl1e setting, it is no wonder that 
the events of both Pearl I Iarbor and Sep-
tember 11 came as a complete shock to 
eyewitnesses. Neither could have hap-
pened on a more pleasant morning. 
\ Ve now know, however, that initial 
e}•ewitness interpretations of both of 
these surprise attacks, as bolts out of the 
blue, were incorrect. Indications of what 
was about to happen were available be-
fore the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor. In fuct, one of the accepted teners of 
the literature on surprise attacks is that 
in all cases or so-called intelligence fail-
ure, accurate information concerning 
what is about to transpire can be found 
in tl1e intelligence system after the fact. 
It is thus to be expected that revelations 
will continue about the signals that were 
in the intelligence pipeline prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September J l. And 
as in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the 
US government will hold a series ofin-
vestig:.ttions to discover how organiza-
tional shortcomings or mistakes made 
by specific offici~i ls were responsible for 
the intelligence fa ilure that paved tl1e 
way for the destruction of the \i\Torld 
Ti-ade Center and the attack on the Pen-
tagon. 
Lt is not surprising that similarities 
exist between the attack on Pearl Har-
bor and the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11 because both events arc C'Xllinples 
of a more general international phenom-
enon- the surprise attack. Despite the 
fact that tl1e) occurred over 50 years 
apart and involve different kin<ls of in-
ternational actors with highly different 
motivations, ;1 pattern exists in the 
events leading up to surprise and its con-
sequences. Ex.'Ploring tliesc similarities 
can help cast the tragedy of September 
11 in a broader context, an important 
initial step in reducing the likelihood of 
mass-casual[)· terrorism in the future. 
Warning Signs 
Although Pearl Ilarhor and the 
September 1 I attacks are sometimes 
depicted as tota lly unanticipated e\'ents, 
both incident were preceded by clear 
indications that the United States faced 
an imminent threat. Prior to Pearl Har-
bor, US-Japanese relations had reached 
a nadir. By tl1e summer of 19-f. l, the ad-
ministration of US President Franklin 
Roosevelt had placed economic sanc-
tions on theJ<1panesc to forcer.hem to 
end their war ag-.tinst China. These sanc-
tions were the proximate cause of the 
Japanese attack. Japanese officials be-
lieved that the US embargo against them 
would ruin their econom), while de-
struction of the US fleet\\ ould provide 
them with some rnanem ering room. 
They intended to quickly seize resource-
rich lands in the Far Fast, fortify their 
newly conquered lands, and then reach 
some son of negotiated settJement witl1 
the United States. 
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The Roose\'elra<lministrntion rec-
ognized that it faced a crisis withJ1pan, 
alt.hough senior officials in \Vashing-
ton did not realize tlrnt o,1hu was in d<lll-
ger until it was too late. Tn their minds, 
it made no sense for lhe] apanese to at-
tack the United States because t.hevsim-
ply lacked the economic resources or 
military capability to defeat the US mili-
tary in a long war. In an ironic twist, the 
Roosevelt adminisa-ation was ultinrnrelr 
proven correct in this estimate. The 
Jap:rnese attack on Pearl I !arbor elimi-
nated the possibility ofUS acquiescence 
to the creation of a Japanese empire in 
the Pacific as well as the C\'entual peace 
<lrrangememJapan hoped lo achieve. 
The situation that faced the United 
States was even more clear cut, if not 
quite as grave, prior to September 11. 
Various smdies and commissions (such 
as the government's Gilmore commis-
sion) described the ongoing struggle 
against terrorism and predicted that a 
significantterrorist attack on the conti-
nental Un ited Stores was a ' 'irtual cer-
t<1inty. The United States was actuall} 
The US Pacific Fleet is 
consumed by flames at 
Pearl Harbor after the 
Japanese surprise attack 
on December 7, 1941. 
INTELLIGENCE 
engaged in ~1 war ,,-ith Al Qnechi, an in-
ternatiom1 I network of terrorist grm1ps, 
throughout t.he 1990s. Al Qaeda mar 
have been loose!} linked to the militia~ 
that battled US Ranger units in Somalia 
in 1993. Al Qaeda also was involved in 
the bombing of the office of the pro-
gram manager for the Saudi Arahian 
National Guard in Riva<lh in Non:m-
ber 1995 and in the attack on the Khobar 
Tower~ complex in Dalmrn in July 19%. 
These attac:b cm US interest~ in 
1995 and 1996 changed the WU) forwm·<l 
deployed US forces operated within the 
Arabian Peninsula. ~ew "force protec-
tion" regulalions were promulgated to 
protecl US military personnel, requir-
ing comm:inders to observe srringenr 
requirements to ensure their ~afcty. In 
Saudi Arabia, CS operational units were 
consolidated at Prince Sultan Air Base 
and advisOf)' components were movcd 
to Eskan \ 'iJlage, a housing complex 
south of Riyadh. I melligence collection 
cfforto; also concentrated on the llC\1 
threat, prO\ icli ng forces throughom the 
region with improved rnctic1I and op-
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erational ll'<'lrning. \t times, US lixcc~ 
''ere pl.iced at "Threatc:on Delrn" in 
expet:tation of :m immediate attack. The 
hardening of the "target" on the .\ra-
bian Peninsula forced , \I Qaeda to look 
ror vulnenibilities else\\ here. 
Any lingering doubts <tboul t11e on-
going threat were dispelleJ h~ .\l 
Qaeda's hornhingofrhe US embassies 
in KcnyH and li.mz;mia in \ugi.1st 1998 
ancl the ;irrnc:k againo;t the CSS Cole in 
Oc:tol>er 2000. The United States even 
returrn.:cl fire follm1ing the 1998 em-
bassr <lllacks b: bw1ching cruise mis-
sile strikes ag·ainst suspected terrorist 
training camps in Afghanistan and a 
pharmaceutical ph111t in Smlan that was 
believed to have links to .\J Q;1e<la. CS 
gcl\'ernmcnt agencies had a clear iclea 
that Osama bin Laden was commiLtcd 
ro aw1c:king US interest:!> globally. Bin 
Laden's 1998.fimM represented n dcc-
lar;1tion or wnr on t.he United States and 
called upon supporters to kill US offi-
cials, c;oldiers, and civilians everywhere 
around the world. This assessment of 
bin L1clcn\ intention!> was reflected in a 
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variety of publicly available sources. 
The US Congressional Research Ser-
vice published a compelling warning 
about bin Laden's campaign of terror 
entitled "Terrorism: Near Eastern 
Groups and St.ate Sponsors" on Septem-
ber l 0, 200 I. A compelling description 
ofbin Laden's aUiance with the Tal iban 
and his political agenda was even pub-
1 ished in Fonign Affairs in 1999. 
Pearl Harbor and the terrorist at-
tacks on September 11 were not bolts 
out of the blue. Bur because they were 
generally perceived to have occurred 
without warning, they both have 
changed attitudes and produced poli-
cies that have reduced the likelihood and 
consequences of surprise attack. Pearl 
Harbor focused strategists' attention on 
the need to avoid the consequences of 
smprise attack, especially when it came 
to US nuclear deterrent threatS. The 
fear of a sw·p1ise attack made the nuclear 
balance of terror appear delicate. As a 
result, enonnous efforts were under-
taken to guarantee that US strategic 
forces could survive a Soviet nuclear 
fense of Pearl Harbor in D ecember 
1941. This di,·ision of responsibilities 
helped to create the conditions for sur-
prise. When V\Tashingron issued a war 
warning to its forces in Hawaij, Army 
officers took steps ro safeguard against 
sabotage, locking up armmuiition and 
concentrating aircraft on the center of 
runways so they could be more easi ly 
guarded. In contrast, Navy officers 
thought that the war warning would 
prompt a vigorous effort on the part of 
the Army to use long-range aircraft to 
patrol the waters around Oahu. Army 
officers thought that Naval intelligence 
had been keeping tabs on the where-
abouts of the Japanese fleet; they did not 
realize that Navy analysts had lost ttack 
of Japanese aircraft carriers in the weeks 
leading up to Pearl Harbor. Further, the 
Army and Navy staffs on Oahu never 
confinned their expectations about what 
each other was doing to safeguard the 
islands from aru1ck. Even perfect liai-
son berween the services, however, 
might not have been enough to prevent 
disaster because no mechanism existed 
largely diverged at the water's edge. TI1e 
Depar011ent of Defense and the Central 
Intel Ligence Agency (CIA) focus on for-
eign threats and intelligence coUection, 
while the Federal Bureau oflnvestiga-
tion focuses on internal security and in-
vestigating crime. 
Local and State police forces oper-
ate in their own jurisdictions and US 
airport security, until recently, was 
largely the responsibility of private 
firms. Addi tionaUy, the definition ofter-
rorism was not without organizational 
consequences. Was it a form of war or a 
type of n<Jtural disaster that would fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency? Vias 
it a homegrown threat involving high 
explosives (e.g. the destruction of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
April 1995) or a new type of threat in-
volving weapons of mass desnuction 
(e.g. the Aum ShinriJ...'Yo aru1ck on the 
Tokyo subway in March 1995)? And as 
this debate about the likelihood and 
form of mass-casualty terrorism un-
folded in the years leading up to Sep-
Because [Pearl Harbor and September I I] were generally perceived to have 
occurred without warning, they both have changed attitudes and produced 
policies that have reduced the likelihood and consequences of surprise attack. 
attack and sti ll be able to assure destruc-
tion of the Soviet Union. Today, the ad-
minisrration of US President George 
Bush is trying to minimize the effects of 
a potential terrorist i11cident by improv-
ing homeland defenses and conse-
quence management, spending US$35 
billion on homeland defense programs. 
US military forces also are pre-empting 
attacks by taking the battle to the ter-
rorists and by training foreign militar-
ies to deal with the threat. 
St:n1,ctural Vulnerabilities 
D espite common misperceptions, 
it was the US Army, and not the US 
Navy, that was responsible For the de-
to collect and disseminate all-source 
intelligence to the operational com-
manders who could put it to good use. 
There is Little evidence to suggest that 
the Japanese knew about these organi-
zational weaknesses in Hawaii's de-
fenses, but organizational shortcominbrs 
facilitated their effort to catch the US 
Aeetunprepared. 
Al Qaeda migbt have understood 
the organizational weakness that re-
duced the likelihood that irs operatives 
would be detected before they struck. 
\ iVhile there was a unified command 
structure in the Persian GuJf to address 
the local ten-or·ist rllfeat, organizational 
responsibilities in the US government 
tember 11 , front-linegovernmentagen-
cies in the war against domestic terror-
ism were allowed to atrophy. US 
Customs and Immigration agents now 
find themselves unprepared for their new 
role in combating domestic terrorism. 
US citizens tend to focus on tech-
nological solutions to problems, often 
forgetting that orgaruzation shapes the 
ability to respond to emerging chal-
lenges. Strong organization-the abil-
ity tO orchestrate the efforts of a vast 
array of individuals and bureaucratic 
acto rs- is imperative if the U nited 
Srates is to effectively spend its resources 
in the war on terrorism. Despite inter-
service rivalry and bureaucratic prefer-
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ences, the org;mi7.ational shortcomings 
that existed priorto Pe:irl Harbor were 
relatil'ely e;lS) to minimize compan.:d 
tot.he lmreaucr:nic and leg:il challenge 
creat.eJ by toJ<1y's war. \ftcr Pc;irl l Tar-
bor, cle;irer lines or respunsibi li1y \\en; 
dr;rn n between the sen ices. By contrast, 
legal questions and scores of jurisdic-
Lion;1) issues presellll) complicme offi-
cial efforts co create 1.hc governmemal 
structures and rebtionships needed to 
generate a comprehensive response to 
terrorism. 
Teclmologicnl S urprise 
The abilit) to uLi lize 1.echnolog) 
crcati,cJy plarcd an important role in 
buth the.J;1panese auad, on Pe;1rl Har-
bor and t.he 1.errcwist auacks of Sept.em-
ber 11. \.Vhen historians \1-Tite ;ibout 
technical surprise, 1.he> locus on the un-
expected introduction or harlhnire or 
\\capon~ that cannot. be quickly coun-
tered hy ;m opponent. The ntt;ic:k on 
Pe;1rl T l:irhor, for example, wa<t made 
possible when the Japanese Jc,•dopeJ 
;lll :1eri:1l torpedo that could function in 
the -.liallcm waters of Pearl I !arbor. But 
the.: Japanese.: success al Pearl 1 lnrbor 
wa~ made pmsihlc b) a broader ime-
INTELLIGENCE 
Al Qaed;1 abo achieved ~l t.cchno-
logical surpri!>c.: on Sc.:pt.ernbc.:r I I. 
Again, there w;1s nothing particular!~· 
no,·cl about the use of aircraft LO con-
duct a suicide mission- ironically it was 
thcJ ap:rncsc.: who inm>ducecl the.: kami-
kaze during the October 19++ CS inv.i-
sion of the Philippines. But hy using ~1 
host of modern technologies produced 
by 1.he inlormat.ion re' ululion and gfo-
b.1lizalion, Al Qaeda opera ti\ es wen: 
able to phtn, orchestra le, and e).ecute '' 
111;1jor "spcci;1l operations" at.tack with-
out the hardware, rrnining, or infrastn.1c-
turc g-cncrnlly a<tsocinrcd wirh 
conducting a preci:>ion ~trike at inter-
rnntinc.:mal ranges. Al Qaecl:J used the 
l.ntcrnet., satellite telephones, anJ cell 
phones LO coortlinate their imcrnalioirnl 
operations, especially Lo conununicate 
\\ ith oper,1ti,es in the Unit.eel SL<Hes. 
They abo used rhe intern:ition:il l>:ink-
ing system to fund cells in the l -nited 
States with om clrnwing undue :mention. 
.\I Q;1cda opernti,·cs rode the mi Is of 
the infonn<llion re\olution, harnessing 
imcrnational con1munication and nn;m-
cial m:t.works lo can-~ om their nefari-
ous schemt.:. 
Tn both instances of surpri-;c, the 
to unclcresri 111;1te opponents' willingness 
to find ways to circum\'cm defenses to 
gain the clement of surpri~c. 
The Interest-Threat Mismatch 
During the 1990s, the debate ;1bout 
the lJnitc.:d States' role in world affairs 
rel'olved around concerns abour the in-
tcrest-rhrcat mismatch. Tn the afte1111ath 
of the Cold 'Var, lcl\1-levl.!I, nagging 
threats-ethnic\ iolcnce, tt.:rrorism, or 
just instability ~md unrest-permeated 
parts of the world. Some ob:>ervcrs sug-
gested th•H these threats had little effect 
on GS national inreresrs. People who 
suggested that the United State~ become 
invoh·ed in pl.ices like Rwanda or even 
Kosmo, for instance, wt.:rc rcall) think-
ing'' ith 1.heir hearts •md not. Lheir heads. 
The issue was not whether the L:nit.ed 
State!> should ''or!- to stop genocide. 
r nstead, the concern was th<H interven-
tion meant an open-ended US commit-
ment to c;ocial engineering that 
realistically lu1d little prospect of suc-
cess. lntt:rvention was <111 option a\ ail-
abk LO the L1nitcd Stale~. but it w11s not 
without opportunity cost~ anJ signifi-
cant risks. lntern!ning in far away places 
like .-\fghrnistan to stop T:ilibnn humnn 
Bin Laden and the Japanese, however, underestimated how surprise attacks 
would alter the political balance within the United States and the way US 
citizens perceived foreign threats. 
g;ration of technology'' ith a ne\.\. con-
cept ol'opcrat.ions tlrnt brought the full 
capabilit) of C•lrrier aYiation to be;ir in,, 
clecisi,·e w;1y. Thi~ demonsrnnion of 
professional militar)' prowess combined 
nc.:'' tcchnolog), t:ict.ic~, and strategy in 
a surprising!~' dc,·a<;t:iting w;1y. Carrier 
avi;1tion itself was not a secrc.:t, but tl1c.: 
Japanese.: exploit.ed t.his nc\\ t.cchnology 
"'ith so much dnring and skill tl1;1t it'' as 
impo:.sible c.:ven for those "ho under-
'>toml 1.he rh rc;1t po~ed by J1pa n LO rLT-
01'{11i£e that. the~ f~1ced such gr;we and 
immcdian.: danger. 
opp()nent used technology in an inno-
vnliYc way to launch a dcv;1st:1ting ovcr-
the-horizon amick. \ncl prior ro both 
artacb, tl1c.: tcchnulog) employed \l<l~ 
;1ctw11l) well 1.:nm\ n ro CS officials and 
officers. Indeed, in the case of Ll1e Sep-
tember 11 atrncks, US citizens, <lS the 
major beneficiaries and supporters of 
glohnliz:1tion, were probably the world's 
lcaJing cxperLs when it. came to harness-
ing new insm.1ments of communicat.ion 
and commerce. H oweYcr, t.her bcked n 
keen awarcnc.:s'> of tl1c Jesµc.:ratiun •llld 
cre;HiYity of their enemies, leading rhcm 
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rights ahu'>es or ro den: \1 (.hwda ;1 :-c-
curc: hasc: of operations was 111.:ver even 
considered. Bush ran 11is 2000 presiden-
ll<li c;1mpaign on reducing the United 
States' international "over-commit-
mems" abroad. The Cnited Snnes' "ca-
su:1lty aversion" seemed to be a m:1jor 
factor in limiting C'S inten·cnlion LO 
stop ethnic 1 iolence and other form<; of 
rnrnage. \nri-dcmocrntic and anti-nwr-
kct Forces, <>pecii'icallp1 tirndamenrnlist 
backlash against t.he way gfob,1 lization 
sprc;1ds \ \ 'est.em c1ilrurc, was not 
clccmcd uf ~ufrlcielll slrcngt.h to pose a 
significant security threat. 
ln the late 1930s, the US intelli-
gence community also perceived a mis-
match between US interests and the 
desirability of responding to the threats 
that were emerging across the globe. 
This perception is difficult to explain in 
hindsight, given the genocidal and ag-
gressive policies of the Nazi regime :md 
Japan's imperial ambitions. On the eve 
of Pearl Harbor, the Nazis had m·c1-rw1 
virn1ally all of Europe and japan had 
been engaged in a war in China for nearly 
a decade. Still, the United States seemed 
to believe that they couJd somehow es-
cape tbe wave of fascism and violence 
that was sweeping the globe. 
Both Al Qaeda and Imperial japan 
attacked th e United States in an effort 
to limit US influence and to stop the 
spread of free markets, democracy, and 
liberal ideas into the Middle East and 
East Asia. Japan believed that US offi-
cials would not have the will to chal-
lenge their initiatives in Asia; Japanese 
leaders felt US "casualty aversion" 
would lead to a negotiated settlement in 
Asia. Bin Laden apparently ex'Pected a 
relatively ineffectual US m ili ta11' re-
sponse (again driven by US concerns 
about casualties) that would in the end 
spark a revolution in moderate Arab re-
gimes, if not ;1 full blown clash of ci,;Ji-
zations between Islam and the West. Bin 
Laden and the Japanese, however, un-
derestimated how surprise attacks 
would alter the political balance within 
the United States and the "'ray US citi-
zens perceived foreign threats. Both also 
failed to recognize how quickly US 
militmy power could be brought to bear 
against them. 
Aftershock 
Many more points of compai·ison 
are possible between Pearl llarbor and 
September LI. At Pearl Harbor, the US 
military stopped about 8 percent of the 
attacking force from either reaching· .its 
target or returning home. On Septem-
ber 11 , airline passengers actually 
stopped 25 percent of the attl:1cking force 
Photo Courtesy AFP PhotofSpace Imaging 
Four days after the 
September I I attacks, 
dust and debris are all 
that remain of the two 
1,350-foot World Trade 
Center towers. 
from reaching its target, saving a US 
landmark from severe damage or t0tal 
destruction. US intelligence analysts is-
sued a war warning before tl1c Pearl 
Jlarborattack, and the US military man-
aged to engage the enemy. On Septem-
ber 11 , intelligence report:.~ of possible 
terrori~t threats had not yet been trans-
lated into a compell ing warning, and the 
US military foiled to interfere witl1 Al 
Qaeda 's suicide mission. 
It also is too early to make a full 
comparison between the two events. 
Japan's experience after Pearl Harbor 
was so unpleasant that the war inocu-
lated Japan's leaders and public alike 
against aggression :ind armed conflict. 
By contrast , Al Qaeda faces extermina-
tion. P e<1rl Harbor had a generation ef-
fect on young people in the United 
States, serving as a warning that the pos-
sibili ty of aggression and surprise can 
never be eliminated .in international re-
lations. However, it remains unclear 
what lessons tl1e young will draw from 
witnessing the destruction of the vVorld 
Trade Center on live teb ision. 
Pearl Harbor and September L l are 
similar in at least one more important 
respect. Bodi surprise attacks renewed 
US interest in world affairs, creating a 
popular conviction that suffering and 
oppression in distant places can only be 
ignored at d1e e>..')Jensc of US security. 
Both attacks halted a creeping iso lation-
ism and both prompreJ changes in US 
govenunentand a renewed commitment 
to the defense o f democracy and eco-
nomic liberty. The origins of the De-
pa.runent of Defense, the ClA, and a host 
of intelligence agencies and programs 
can be tied to diat fateful morning Q\rer 
60 years ago. One can only wonder how 
the United States will change as the ef-
fects of September LI begi n to ripple 
across governmental institutions and 
popular culture. \Ne can hope that these 
changes will not only reduce US vul-
nerability to mass-casualty terrorist at-
tacks but also eliminate the incentives 
for others to carry o ut terrorist acts in 
the future. llJ 
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